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THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT: TOWARD
A PUNITIVE PHILOSOPHY
NoRVAL MoRRis*

use of imprisonment as a penal sanction is of primary
philosophical and practical importance to the future of society.
With the increasing vulnerability of our social organization and the
growing complexity and interdependence of governmental structures,
reassessment of appropriate limits on the power that society should
exercise over its members becomes increasingly important. Perhaps
if the "prison problem" is solved, many of the uneasy tensions benveen freedom and power in postindustrial society will diminish. ·
The effort made here will, I hope, contribute to the solution of the
"prison problem" by offering a new model of imprisonment that
recognizes fundamental principles of justice as well as the legitimate
exercise of society's power over the individual.
We need to address nvo blunt questions in constructing a new
model of imprisonment: (1) Why imprison a convicted criminal in
the first instance? (2) Why not imprison all convicted criminals
until risk of future criminality is past? Any useful response to these
questions requires me to outline a philosophy under which imprisonment can be applied with restraint and humanity until it is no longer
needed for social control.
My premise throughout is that penal purposes are properly retributive, deterrent, and incapacitative. Attempts to add reformative
purposes to that mixture-as an objective of the sanction as distinguished from a collateral aspiration-yield neither clemency,
justice, nor, as presently administered, social utility. We may utilize
our rehabilitative skills to assist the prisoner toward social readjustment, but we should never seek to justify an extension of power over
him on the ground that we may thus more likely effect his reform.1
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This article is a revised version of the third of three lectures given by the author
in the Thomas M. Cooley Lecture Series, University of Michigan Law School, on March
19, 20, and 21, 1974.
I. The proper use of rehabilitation in the prison context was fully explored by
Professor Morris in the first Cooley lecture. The reader interested in a more complete
exposition of Professor Morris's views may consult N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, to be published shortly by the University of Chicago Press. For another
recent view, see L. OHLIN, CoRRECTIONAL STRATEGIES IN CONFLicr, paper presented to
the American Philosophical Society, Nov. 9, 1973 (to be published in the Proceedings
of the Society).-Ed.
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WHY SHOULD A CONVICTED CRIMINAL BE IMPRISONED?
I

As usual, clarification of what is not involved in this question is
a necessary prelude to answering what is. I am not discussing the
challenging and significant problems involved in setting terms of
imprisonment in a way that guarantees that like cases will be treated
alike and all treated fairly. The principles suggested will, with
suitable modifications, apply to the assessment of the appropriate
duration of imprisonment by the legislature and by the judge, and
to all sentencing decisions as they are later taken by parole boards
and correctional authorities. However, for ease of analysis the present
effort isolates the issue of imprisonment vel non. The objective is
to offer principles to aid a judge in determining whether he should
impose a sentence of imprisonment or some lesser sanction. Although
these principles apply whenever this issue is addressed-by the legislator, the prosecutor, the judge, the parole board member-analysis
is focused on .the judge's decision.
Clarity is best served by sketching the complete model in relatively
narrow compass before elaborating on its details. First, three principles to guide the decision to imprison are submitted:
(I) Parsimony: The least restrictive or least punitive sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be
chosen.
(2) Dangerousness: Prediction of future criminality is an unjust basis for determining that the convicted criminal should be
imprisoned.
(3) Desert: No sanction greater than that "deserved" by the
last crime or bout of crimes for which the offender is being
sentenced should be imposed.
Thereafter, three conjunctive preconditions to the judicial imposition of a sentence of imprisonment are developed in more concrete
form:
(1) Conviction by jury or bench trial or a procedurally acceptable guilty plea to an offense for which the legislature has
prescribed imprisonment;
(2) Determination that imprisonment is the least restrictive
sanction appropriate in the particular case because either a) a
lesser punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the
crime(s) committed; b) imprisonment of some who have done
what the particular criminal has done is necessary to achieve
socially justified deterrent purposes, and his punishment ad-
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vances that end; or c) other less restrictive sanctions have been
frequently or recently applied to him; and
(3) Judgment that imprisonment is not a punishment that
society would deem undeserved or excessive in relation to the
last crime or series of crimes that the individual has committed.
It may assist to offer some commentary on the principles suggested
to guide the decision to imprison and then to draw a sharp contrast between the preconditions to imprisonment submitted here and
those adopted in most of the recent criminal codes.

Parsimony
/
The first principle recommends parsimony in the use of imprisonment. This principle is not novel. A presumption in favor of punishments less severe than incarceration pervades all recent scholarship
and most legislative reforms. Justification for this utilitarian and
humanitarian principle follows from the belief that any punitive
suffering beyond societal need is, presumably, what defines cruelty.
Emerging case law and commentary supports this principle of the least
drastic means.2 Specifically, the draftsmen of the American Law Institute's (ALI) Model Penal Code sought to include the principle in
the Code's main article on sentencing. Section 7.01, enumerating
"Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing
Defendant on Probation," directs the court to order other punishments unless "imprisonment is necessary for protection of the public."8 Over one-half of the states have undertaken substantial revision
of their criminal codes during the past decade, all profoundly influenced by the ALI model. The same influence is apparent in current
proposals for reform of the federal criminal code. In accord are the
American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice4 and the recommendations of the two national
crime commissions of the past decade. 5 Moreover, although constituA.

2. See, e.g., Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional° Aspects of the Burden
of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing
Determinations, 58 CORNELL L REv. 51 (1972). Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237
(2d Cir. 1972); Wormuth &: Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter ALI CODE]. Of special
interest are sections 7.0l(l)(a), 7.01(2)(i), and 7.03(3). Cf. id., Article 6.
4. ABA PROJECT ON :MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JumCE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 2.2, 2.3 (1968) [hereinafter ABA PROJEcr].
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIErY 141-43 (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMN. ON
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tional support for the parsimony principle is hesitant, the analogies
are clear. Imprisonment as a sanction for a common cold or for
being a narcotic addiot would be unconstitutional; 6 to place a prisoner involved in a scuffie into maximum security segregation for two
years may be invalid as punishment not reasonably related to the infraction for which it was imposed; 7 and the death penalty would be
unconstitutional for a rape in which life was neither taken nor endangered.8 Finally, courts and legislatures have expressly accepted the
principle of parsixp.ony in relation both to the civil commitment
of the mentally ill and the conditions of their detention. 0 Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit, in their important new study Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child, offer a principle similar to that of the least
restrictive or least punitive sanction, applicable to all situations in
which child placement by a court is involved, expressly including
juvenile delinquency matters involving violence. Even were the law
to make society's immediate safety the primary goal, they would
argue that the least detrimental alternative placement should be
selected.10
The wisdom of parsimonious use of imprisonment is no longer
questioned, unless doubt is cast upon it by the second fundamental
question we face-why not imprison all criminals convicted of serious crime until risk of their recidivism is past? I will return to that
question shortly.
B. Dangerousness

With the second principle-that dangerousness as a predictor of
future criminality is an unjust basis for imprisoning-we move from
the broadly accepted to the highly contentious.
Let me try to define the issue precisely before grappling with it.
Courts around the world impose imprisonment instead of community-based punishments, or increase terms of imprisonment beyond
the measure that the specific crime justifies, for a variety of grounds
that resemble what I will call "dangerousness." The grounds include:
CRIMINAL JumCE STANDARDS AND GOALS, TASK FORCE ON Coruu:cnoNs 150-54 (1973)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE ON CoRlU!.CTIONS].
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
7. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
8. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 952 (1972).
9. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, lJ6,i
F:2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1969); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1966); Developments in the Law
-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV, 1190, 1245-53 (1974).
10. A.- GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST lNTEREstS OF THE CIIILD
153 (1973).
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The criminal committed crime before; he committed this type of
crime before; he committed many crimes before; he has made a profession of crime; he committed niany other crimes at about the same
time as this one; he acted with peculiar brutality, or used a gun, or
determinedly retained the proceeds of his crime; or there has been
a recent rash of similar crimes. All these grounds merit consideration.
I set them aside in favor of closer analysis of one other ground that
seems t6 be gaining acceptance in the United States and in Europe,
namely, that the crime and what we learn of the criminal lead us to
the view that he probably will commit a serious crime of personal
violence in the future. This prediction is what I will term the prediction of dangerousness.
There is a seductive appeal to separating the dangerous and the
nondangerous offender and confining imprisonment principally to
the former. It would be such a neat trick were it possible: prophylactic punishment-the preemptive judicial strike, scientifically justified-designed to save potential victims of future crimes and at the
same time minimize the use of imprisonment and reduce the time
served by most prisoners. But it is a trap. Social consequences are
often counterintuitive. The concept of dangerousness is so plastic
and vague, its implementation so imprecise, that it would not substantially reduce the present excessive use of imprisonment.
It must be admitted, however, that dangerousness as a determinative guide to the use of imprisonment does have impressive support.
Perhaps most impressive are the reform efforts of Herbert Wechsler,
Paul Tappan, Francis Allen, and a small group of other scholars and
practitioners in the mid-1950's and early 1960's. Those efforts, doubtless the most important attempt to bring-rationality to the criminal
law since the codification efforts of Macauley and Stephen in the,last
quarter of the nineteenth century, are embodied in the sentencing
provisions of the ALI Model Penal Code.11 The themes behind the
provisions are, in the main, sound and .worthy of emulation. First,
fines and community-based treatments such as probation, where reasonably applicable, are preferable to imprisonment as penal sanctions. Second, the range of prison sentences for felonies should be
reduced to three or four categories of gravity. Third, within those
categories, the grounds on which a court may exercise its discretion
to impose imprisonment should be defined with some degree of
precision. A principal aim t~roughout, if judges can be persuaded
or required to give reasons for their sentences, is to b:Uild a common
11. ALI ConE, supra note 3, §§ 701-09.

1166

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 72:1161

law of sentencing. Provisions for appeal against sentence have simi•
lar purposes. Finally, however, the Model Penal Code and its
progeny provide for the imposition of "extended terms" of imprisonment upon persistent, professional, psychologically disturbed, and
dangerous or multiple offenders.12
The final provision, specifically as it makes dangerousness a
determinative guide to the use of imprisonment, has been widely
adopted. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD),
for instance, maintains that "confinement is necessary only for offenders who, if not confined, would be a serious danger to the
public.''13 The 1973 Task Force on Corrections of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommends that "state penal code revisions should include a provision
that a maximum sentence for any offender not specifically found to
represent a substantial danger to others should not exceed 5 years
for felonies other than murder."14 Extended terms beyond five years,
indeed up to twenty-five years, might be imposed on the "persistent
felony offender," the "professional criminal," and the "dangerous
offender.''15 The Code has also profoundly influenced the reshaping
of the criminal codes of a number of states16 and other states are in
the process of emulation. If Congress acts on.a new federal criminal
code, I have no doubt that it ·will also incorporate sentencing provi·sions fashioned after the ALI Model Penal Code prototype. 17
The various proposals share a desire to reduce the use of imprisonment as a penal sanction by favoring less drastic punishments, by
shortening prison sentences imposed on those criminals who have to
be imprisoned, and by selecting defined categories of criminals for
12. Id. § 7.03. See also .ADVISORY CoUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATL. COUNCIL ON CRIME
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING Acr, art. III, § 5 (1972): ABA PROJEcr, supra
note 4, §§ 2.5, 3.1. An excellent guide to the literature in this area and the area of
sentencing and correctional issues generally is R. GoLDFARB &: L. SINGER, AFI'ER CON•
VICl'ION (1973).
13. The Nondangerous Offender Should Not Be Imprisoned, A Policy Statement,
19 CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 449, 449 (1973).
Sometimes the same theme is developed in different and more apparently acceptable
AND

language. The American Assembly's Report on "Prisoners in America" recommended
that "[h]igh risk offenders may be required to serve fixed periods of time. Low risk
offenders should be released to community-based programs as soon as feasible." REFORT OF THE 42n AMERICAN AssEMBLY 7 (December l7-20, 1972). For the background
reading to this report see PRISONERS IN AMERICA (L. Ohlin ed. 1973).
14. TASK FORCE ON CoRRECl'IONS, supra note 5, at 150.
15. Id. at 155-57.
16. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
17. See NAnONAL COMMN. ON REroRM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUDY DRAFT OF
A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3202(5) (1970) [hereinafter STUDY DRAFT].
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· protracted incarceration, largely on grounds of their dangerousness. ·
Admittedly benevolent purposes inspire these legislative and scholarly reform efforts. Only the dangerous are to be imprisoned; only
the very dangerous are to be protractedly imprisoned. However, we
are far enough down the road of penal reform to realize that benevolent purposes do not guarantee 'f:eneficent results.
One can well understand the politics of the taxonomy without
accepting the concepts on which it is based. An effort to confine imprisonment to the dangerous has obvious political appeal. Provision
for extended sentences for the particularly dangerous may allew us
to avoid the worst abuses of the habitual criminal and the sexual
psychopath laws whose application has proved grotesquely unjust
throughout this country.18 Indeed, the political justifications for the
use of the danger~usness concept are sometimes expressly recognized.
For example, the report of the National Advisory Commission suggests that "[c]lear authority to sentenc~ the 'dangerous offender' to
a long term of incapacitation may induce the legislature to agree
more readily to a significantly shorter sentence for the nondangerous
offender.''19 In other words, let us continue to deal unjustly with a
few so that we can persuade the legislature to deal more effectively
and fairly with the many!
Predictions of future criminality, it is submitted, are an unjust basis for imposing or prolonging imprisonment. Despite the
weight of authority supporting the principle of dangerousness, it
must be rejected because it presupposes a capacity to predict quite
beyond our present or foreseeable technical ability. We are not inquiring whether the ill-educated, feckless, vocationally deprived
ghetto youth is likely to be involved in crime-of course he is. We
are not talking about minor crime or crime in general. The focus is
on our capacity to predict crimes of some gravity, mostly crimes of
violence to the person.
Although predictions of violent crime can fail in two ways, we
18. See generally Cohen, Adminll:tration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute
in Indiana, 32 IND. LJ. 450 (1957); Granucci 8: Granucci, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath
Act in Operation, 44 IND. L.J. 555 (1969); Hacker 8: Frym, The Sexual Psychopath
Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. '766 (1955); Swanson, Sexual
Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 215 (1960); Tappan,
Some Myths About the Sex Offender, 19 FED. PROB., June, 1955 at 7; Note, Out of Tune
with the Times; The Massachusetts SDP Statute, 45 B.U. L. R.Ev. 391 (1965);
Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 527 (1966); Note, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persorn
Act, 1966 U. !LL. LF. 449; Comment, California's Sexual Psychopath-Criminal or Patient?, 1 u. SAN FRAN. L. REv. ?32 (1967).
19. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, nipra note 5, at 156.
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have developed an extremely useful technique to conceal the most
troublesome failures from ourselves. Illustratively, suppose that we
attempt to project future violence to the person from among one
hundred convicted criminals. Permit me to invent figures that are
far superior to any we can now achieve. Assume that of the one hundred, we select thirty as likely future violent criminals. Despite our
prediction, all one hundred are either released or left at large. Observing their subsequent careers, we obtain the results with hypothetical precision. Of the thirty predicted as dangerous, twenty do
commit serious crimes of violence and ten do not. Of the seventy
we declare to be relatively safe, five commit crimes of violence
and sixty-five do not. Table I summarizes the data:
TABLE I
Prediction
Safe
Violent Crime

70

so

100

Result
No Violent Crime
65
IO

75

Violent Crime
5

20
25

Reading this chart one might claim "We had eighty per cent
success in our prediction, successfully preselecting twenty out of the
twenty-five who later committed serious crimes of violence." We
failed to select five of the one hundred who later proved to be dangerous, hut that seems a minor failure compared with the twenty
serious crimes we could have prevented. Note, however, that we also
failed in another way. We selected ten as dangerous-as likely to
commit crimes of violence-but they were not. Had we exercised
greater power over the thirty that we predicted as dangerous we
would have failed in our prediction by needlessly detaining ten persons. More succinctly, we made twenty "true positive" predictions of
violence and ten "false positive" predictions.
To increase our claimed eighty per cent success-to diminish
the number we predicted as safe but who were in fact dangerouswe could certainly increase the number of our true positive predictions of dangerousness, but only at the cost of substantially increasing
the number of false positive predictions. There, if you :will reflect
on it, is the moral dilemma we face: How many false positives can
we justify in exchange for preventing crimes perpetrated by the true
positives? I shall return to this dilemma below.
Rarely in practice do we have an opportunity to confront the
naked jurisprudential issues in the neat hypothetical form posed
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here. Moreover, we possess·an extremely convenient mechanism by
which to conceal from ourselves our critical incapacity as predictors
-the mask of overprediction. If in doubt, put him in or keep him
in. Why risk injury or death to potential innocent victiJD.S, particularly since the freedom involved is that of a person who has been
convicted of crime? I do not mean to sound pejorative; I would no
doubt feel pressured to do the same thing myself. If unsure about
the future violent behavior of a person currently under control and
for whom that control can legally be prolonged, the politically safe
choice is to give the benefit of the, doubt to any future victim
rather than to the criminal or to the prisoner. What is wonderfully
convenient about this overprediction of risk is that the predictor
does not know who in particular he needlessly holds. Further,
he is most unlikely to precipitate any political or administrative
trouble in ordering or prolonging imprisonment. By contrast, one
is quite likely to be in water too warm for comfort when those people
whom one has released, but who could legally have been detained,
do involve themselves in crimes of violence, particularly if those
crimes are sensationally reported. Hence, the path of administrative
and political safety is the path of the overpredicted risk.
A further important consequence of the mask of overprediction
is that we lack sufficient empirical studies of our predictive capacity.
All of us, of course, are masters at retrospective prediction, characterized by the tired phrase, "I told you so." We are less sure of our
capacity as prospective predictors, in part because we are not in the
position critically to test our predictions while those we have predicted as dangerous languish in institutions. Two recent opportunities to test the matter demonstrate the point. One occurred by force
of a judicial decision, the other by the diligence of an imaginative
and protracted research effort.
The United States ~upreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v.
Herold20 presented a natural experiment in the overprediction of
dangerousness. The state of New York had been classifying psychologically disturbed prisoners as suitable for detention in the institution for the criminally insane at Dannemora.21 Some were held in
this institution beyond the term of their sentence, if, after psychiatric
examination, they were deemed mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or to others. The Court affirmed the rather obvious proposition that such prisoners could. not be held beyond the period of their
20. 383 lf.s. 101 (1966).
21. See also Carroll v. McNeil, 294 F.2d 117 {2d Cir. 1961), · vacated, 369 U.S. 149

{1962).

1170

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1161

original criminal sentence without receiving the usual due process
protections of the ordinary civil commitment procedures. When the
prisoner's criminal sentence expires he must be given the same protections given ordinary persons, not merely the lesser protections the
state extends to mentally ill prisoners. The immediate administrative effect of this decision was to compel the release or transfer to
ordinary mental hospitals of each of the 967 "Baxstrom patients."
They had to be either released into the community or committed
to civil mental hospitals pursuant to ordinary civil commitment
procedures.
Several studies of the subsequent careers of these predicted dangerous criminals have sought to determine the results of the mass release occasioned by the Supreme Court's decision. The broad conclusion is that there W'as gross overprediction of dangerousness.
Perhaps the most intensive study was that reported in 1971 by Doctor
Henry Steadman and his associates. They conclude, in part:
Two striking facts about the Baxstrom patients are the high proportion released after transfer to the civil hospitals and the low proportion subsequently readmitted ....
. . . [D]uring their first year of civil hospitalization the Baxstrom
patients were not as troublesome as had been expected. Our findings
suggest that they were equally not dangerous after they were released. Between 1966 and 1970, barely 21 of the 967 Baxstrom patients returned to Matteawan or Dannemora. All of the findings
- seriously question the legal and psychiatric structures that retained
these 967 people for an average of 13 [years] in institutions for the
criminally insane.22

The Baxstrom patients certainly proved less dangerous than predicted. The Steadman study worked with 246 of the 967 released.
Only three per cent of that group were returned to correctional facilities or institutions for the criminally insane between 1966 and October 1970. Their release rate from civil hospitals was higher than that
of comparable patients civilly committed to state hospitals. With
respect to their community adjustment, a large number-fifty-six per
cent of the males and forty-three per cent of the females-had no subsequent readmission to mental hospitals during th~ four years cov22. Steadman &: Halfon, The Baxstrom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes, 3
SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 376, 384 (1971). The findings are updated in Steadman &:
Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Ba:<strom Patients:
1966-70, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). A book-length analysis of th~ careers of the
Baxstrom patients, related to other studies of the criminally insane, is currently being
considered for publication under the title of H. STEADMAN &: J. CocoZZA, CAREERS OF
THE CRIMINALLY INSANE.
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ered by the study. Subsequent-criminal activity was also low:Thirteen of the eighty-four released patients for whom there was adequate
follow-up information had a total of eighteen criminal contacts with
the police, a remarkably Im~ rate considering the fact that all had
been held as dangerous criminals, likely to be violent.
·
In effect, the Supreme Court in Baxstrom compelled the testing
of our predictions of violence; the test revealed massive overprediction. To regard practice in New York and the institutions of Dannemora and Matteawan as lying outside the mainstream of practice in
institutions for the criminally insane would be erroneous. The story
of the Baxstrom patients could be told for many of the people we
currently hold in prisons and mental hospitals in many parts of the
world because we deem them likely to be involved in future violence.
A recent research project lends further support to this ~onclusion. In October 1972, Doctors Harry Kozol, Richard Boucher, and
Ralph Garofalo reported on a ten-year study designed to test their
capacity to define and predict dangerousness. 23 They selected a, high
risk group of offenders in Massachusetts prisons. With unusually extensive clinical and social case work resources-independent examinations in every case by at least two psychiatrists and a social worker
-they endeavored to predict the likely future dangerousness of each
offender prior to his consideration for release. They identified for
the releasing authority those offenders who in their view were dangerous and those who were not. Their thesis was that "[t]he validity
of our diagnostic criteria and the effectiveness of treatment may be
judged by comparing the behavior of patients released on our recommendation with the behavior of those who were released against our
advice."24 Table II summarizes the results of the Kozol study: 25
TABLE II
Prediction
Safe

Violent Crime

Result
No Violent Crime
49

355
32

435

387

386

Violent Crime
31 (lM)
17 (2M)
48

The Kozol team was attempting to predict serious assaultive behavior. They were remarkably effective predictors, functioning at
23. Kozol, Boucher &: Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,.
18 CRIME &: DELINQUENCY 371 (1972).
24. Id. at 389.
25, The figures "IM" and "2M" in the violent crime rolumn refer to one murder
and two murders, respectively.
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the forefront of our present clinical predictive capacity.20 Though
the likelihood of assaultive behavior was more than four times
greater among those released against the researchers' advice than for
those released on their advice, 27 consider the cost paid. 0£ the fortynine who were released against the advice of the Kozol team, thirtytwo did not subsequently commit any serious assaultive crimes during five years of freedom. S,wing each true positive-benefiting the
community and, indeed, the offender by preventing his inevitable
commission of a serious assaultive crime-requires the detention of
t\vo others who were also expected to be involved in serious assaultive
behavior, but who, in fact, would not be so involved were they released. Detention of t\vo false positives is the cost of preventing one
true positive. Kozol and his associates are, of course, fully aware of
this tradeoff, and their report is a model of the careful collection of
data that policy makers must have to face the difficult jurisprudential
and ethical problems that underlie the proper use of imprisonment. 28
We must not leave this area without appreciating the political
danger in the current widespread acceptance of dangerousness as a
justification for imposing imprisonment or as a basis for prolonging
the duration of a prison term. So imprecise is the concept of dangerousness that the punitively minded will have no difficulty in classifying within it virtually all who currently find their miserable ways
to prison, and, in addition, many offenders who currently receive
probation or other community-based treatments. One need not look
26. The ;results here are far superior to parole boards' capacity to predict violence
on parole. Two recent studies from the California Department of Corrections research
group by Doctor Wenk and his associates should give pause to any member of a parole
board who has confidence in his capacities as a seer of future violent crime. The effort
by this skilled group to develop a "violence prediction scale" for use in parole decisions
resulted in eighty-six per cent of those identified as potentially dangerous failing to
commit a violent act (more accurately, to be detected in a violent act) while on parole.
See Wenk, Robison &: Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
393 (1972), and the excellent study of this problem by Geis and Monahan, The Social
Ecology of Violence, soon to be published in MAN AND MORALITY (T. Lickona ed.).
27. More than thirty-four per cent of the "Violent" group were reportedly involved
in violent assaultive behavior. This compares to an incidence of such behavior among
the "Safe" group of slightly more than eight per cent.
28, A vigorous reanalysis of the implications of the Kozol study is being pursued by
Doctor Kozol, Professor Alfred F. Conard of The University of Michigan Law School,
Professor Franklin E. Zimring of The University of Chicago Law School, and the author.
It threatens to produce another methodological article on the predictability of dangerousness. At issue are (a) the implications of the nonrelease of certain offenders, not
included in the study, who were classified as dangerous by Doctor Kozol and his as•
sociates, and (b) the appropriate attribution of unreported or undetected crimes to
those described in this text as the subjects of false positive predictions of violence.
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too closely at the populations of city jails and state prisons before
safely rationalizing their inclusion under the expansive rubric of
"dangerousness."
Yet, it must be admitted, our inability to predict dangerousness
with any acceptable measure of certainty does not alone compel the
abandonment of dangerousness as a determinant of the decision to
imprison. There are those, no doubt, who would accept the cost.
Thus, any firm conclusion drawn from these observations on our
modest capacity to predict violent behavior must await resolution
of the second question addressed here-why risk any future criminality by releasing convicted criminals? My mvn conclusion may properly be foreshadowed: As a matter of justice we should never take
power over the convicted person based on uncertain predictions of
his dangerousness.
C. Desert
The third general principle guiding the decision to imprison dictates a maximum of punishment limited by the concept of desert:
No sanction greater than that "deserved" by·the last crime, or series
of crimes, for which the offender is being sentenced should be imposed. The principle strikes directly at the larger question I have
deferred, namely, why not hold all convicted criminals until risk of
recidivism is past? My answer, in part, is that the link between established crime and deserved suffering is a central precept of everyone's
sense of justice, or, more precisely, of everyone's perception of injustice. To use the innocent as a vehicle for general deterrence would
be seen by ·a11 as unjust, although it need not be ineffective if the
innocence of the punished is concealed from the threatened group.
Punishment in excess of what the community feels is the maximum
suffering justly related to the harm the criminal has inflicted is, to
the extent of the excess, a punishment of the innocent, notwithstanding its effectiveness for a variety of purposes.
That the concept of desert is not quantifiable and that it varies
in time and place under the stress of changing circumstances does
not reduce its centr~ importance as a necessary ceiling of punishment.
D. Preconditions to Imprisonment
To take the matter beyond generalities and offer a more precise
answer to the question of when a sentence of imprisonment may
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justly be imposed, we should contrast the provisions of the ALI
Model Penal Code with the substantially different preconditions to
imprisonment offered above.
Section 7.01 of the Model Penal Code directs the court not to
sentence the convicted criminal to imprisonment unless:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sent~nce or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.29 ·
Later state and federal reforms of sentencing practice have built
upon, and, in varying degree, adopted these three criteria for resolving the question of whether or not to imprison.Bo
As we have seen, criterion (a) is entirely unacceptable as a matter_
of principle. We lack the capacity to predict dangerousness that this
criterion assumes, and, even if we could predict with substantially
greater precision, to take power based on such a prediction is, as
discussed below, an abuse of human rights.
The second criterion-the need for correctional treatment-unambiguously accepts the worst assumptions underlying the coercive
rehabilitative model. It too must be rejected as an abuse of power
over the individual. "Rehabilitation," whatever it means and whatever the programs that allegedly give it meaning, must cease to be a
purpose of the prison sanction. This does not mean that we must
abandon the variety of treatment programs developed within prisons.
On the contrary, they need expansion. However, it does mean that
they must not be seen as purposive in the sense that criminals are
sent to prison for treatment. We must draw a sharp distinction between the primary purposes of incarceration and available opportunities for the training and assistance of prisoners that may be pursued
within those purp'oses.B1
The third criterion-that any punishment other than imprisonment would not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the defendant's crime (sometimes expressed, "that imprisonment is necessary
to deprecate the crime") has received universal acceptance, and,
currently at least, provides an unavoidable justification for imprison~9. ALI CODE, supra note 3.
30. See, e.g., ILL. REv.
note 17, § 3101.

31. See note 1 supra.

STAT,

ch. 38, § 1005--6-1 (1973). See also

STUDY

DRAFr, supra
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ment. It reflects the obverse of the argument of the maximum
deserved punishment as a ceiling to punishment. Retribution, socialized under the criminal law from its roots in individual vengeance, not only limits the worst suffering we can inflict on the
criminal but also dictates the minimum sanction a community will
tolerate. For example, the typical wife slayer convicted of murder is
most unlikely to be involved in future criminality, would be a safe
bet under Model Penal Code criterion (a) were it acceptable, and
probably needs none of the retraining contemplated by criterion (b).
Nonetheless, he cannot, as a routine matter, be put on probation or
given a suspended sentence, even were a showing made that the
incidence of wife slaying would not increase upon a reduction
of the frequency of imprisonment of wife slayers. The criminal
law has general behavioral standard-setting functions; it acts as a
moral teacher, and consequently requires a retributive floor to punishment as well as a retributive ceiling.
If only one of the Code's criteria proves acceptable, what should
we substitute? The three criteria I have offered could form the foundation for a jurisprudence of the imprisonment decision for legislatures and courts that care to create a_ statutory and common law of
imprisonment.
The first criterion derives directly from the Code and requires,
only brief amplification. Imprisonment should be the least restrictive punishment appropriate in a given case because any lesser punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime(s) committed.
An example of a typical murderer has been suggested; many others
come to mind based on the brutality of the crime or the particular
circumstances or notoriety of the criminal. Many white-collar crimes
or crimes by those in positions of public responsibility or high public
office belong in this category. The criterion requires, in brief, the
lowest level of clemency tolerable under current punitive mores.
My second criterion-the necessities of general deterrence and
the appropriateness of this offender for deterrent purposes-finds no
place in current codes but remains; in my view, inescapable.32 For
example, it forms the principle on which rests the entire structure of
income tax sanctions. Not every tax felon need be imprisoned, only
a number sufficient to keep t~e law's promises and to encourage_therest of us to honesty. Present arrangements for imprisoning federal
32. See generally F. ZIMRING &: G. HAWKINS; DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CoNl'ROL

(1973).
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tax offenders give an object lesson in the parsimonious application
of general deterrent sanctions: Approximately 80 million tax returns
were filed in 1972; only forty-three per cent of the 825 individuals
convicted of tax fraud were jailed.33
General deterrent purposes are also justified in many other areas
of the crimfnal law, although they will frequently not call for imprisonment in areas serving merely regulatory purposes. The limitation of the maximum deserved punishment for the particular offender precludes imprisonment in this context unless, of course, the
violation follows repeated breaches of the law, in which event the
third suggested justification of imprisonment will apply.
The third criterion for imposing imprisonment concerns cases
in which lesser sanctions have frequently or recently been imposed
on a given offender for earlier bouts of crime. This f aute de mieux
criterion is also subject to a retributive maximum; no repetition of
the entirely inconsequential should lead to imprisonment. However,
there must be a role for imprisonment if lesser sanctions have been
appropriately applied and the offender comes yet again for punishment. The criminal law must keep its retributive promises, although
it need not be precipitous fo moving to its heavy weaponry.
These principles-the least restrictive sanction; imprisonment
only when any alternative punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, or is necessary for general deterrence, or when all
else practicable has been applied; the whole limited by a concept of
the maximum deserved punishment-offer a basis on which a rational use may be made of imprisonment.
One further comment is pertinent. No principled jurisprudence
of sentencing will emerge before legislatures bring order to their
penal statutes or before judges routinely provide reasons for the
sentences they impose. Only in this manner can the broad and detailed sweep of a common law of sentencing evolve.
II.

WHY NOT IMPRISON ALL CONVICTED CRIMINALS UNTIL
RISK OF FUTURE' CRIMINALITY Is PAST?

It was suggested above that the incarceration of persons beyond
a just maximum period for the sake of preventing the future crimes
of a "dangerous" minority is improper. But why should we not try
coercively to "cure" criminals, either in the therapeutic sense of
33. The conviction figures include convictions after trial as well as pleas of guilty
and nolo contendere. 1972 COMMR. OF INT. R.Ev. ANN. REP. 18-19.

0
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changing their behavior or in the sense of insulating ourselves from
their future depredations? Is opposition to such cures a question of
our inability to do so or an acknowledgement that it would cost too
much? Or are there other reasons? Suppose we could, by an injection
invented tomorrow, transform the criminal lion to the conforming
lamb? For "cures" in the second sense-merely protecting the unconvicted from the convicted-we have the machinery at hand. Capital punishment is an unqualifiedly successful cure; castration, either
surgically or chemically achieved, substantially diminishes rapespecific recidivism. Virtually all criminals can have their subsequent
violent crime dramatically reduced by detaining them in prison until
their fiftieth birthdays. Why should we not detain all predicted dangerous offenders beyond the just maximum period of imprisonment
for what they have done? After all, such punishment will, as adequately demonstrated by the Kozol study, protect from serious personal injury the likely victims of at least one of each three so detained. Surely, some will no doubt argue, thus to prevent serious
crime justifies protracted incarceration of those who are, after all,
convicted felons.
The question pushes us to fundamentals. Is it a utilitarian issue
or one of justice? The answer depends on the question's frame of
reference. If the discussion of values be confined to the criminal law,
surely imprisonment beyond the otherwise just punishment may be
based on current predictions of dangerousness. We can in this manner prevent some serious crimes of violence-and those who pay the
cost of the gradual capital punishment that is protracted imprisonment are not particularly valuable citizens anyhow. The community
seems prepared to meet the relatively small costs of providing the
prison cages; it seems, if anything, quite pleased to do so.
On the other hand, a different frame of reference leads to a different answer. Incarceration based on predicted dangerousness is
unjust not because of a concern for the diminution of crime or the
protection of prisoners. Rather, we should oppose excessive punishments because of fundamental views of human dignity. We do not
suspect, we know, that respect for the human condition requires
drawing precise justiciable restraints on powers assumed over other
persons. Slavery, in certain settings, provides a clearly desirable
social and economic way of Jife-for other than the slaves. We reject
it for a larger view of man and society in which we establish dogmatic
prescriptions of human dignities, and, to the best of our governmental abilities, protect them. Fairness and justice in the individual
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case, not a generalized cost-benefit utilitarian weighing, dictate the
choice.
Liberty, Rawls tells us, may only be limited in the interest of
liberty itself and not for other social and economic advantages. 84
We may accept the proposition, and, with Rawls, test our principles
of justice by asking whether "free and rational persons," ignorant of
their own abilities and social positions and standing in what Rawls
terms "the original position," would adopt minimum standards for
prison and criteria for imprisonment. Rawls does not reach this question. At the "original position" he would exclude the prisoner from
the group of "free and rational persons concerned to further their
own interests ... in an initial position of equality."86 Thus, assuming
the individual can by his behavior choose riot to become a prisoner,
one could argue that from behind "the veil of ignorance" that characterizes social contracting at the original position, no one would
identify himself as a potential prisoner. No one would, therefore,
concern himself with the presence or absence of fair and just criteria
for imprisonment.
34. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JurnCE 244 (1971). The reader unacquainted with Rawls's
theory may be assisted by a summary of his "Main Idea," and of his view that liberty
may be limited only for the sake of liberty. Such summarization is a task not to be
attempted without an intellectual safety net. So, let me offer the words of H,LA.
Hart:
rP]rinciples of justice do not rest on mere intuition yet are not to be derived
from utilitarian principles or any other teleological theory holding that there is
some form of good to be sought and maximised. Instead, the principles of justice
are to be conceived as those that free and rational persons concerned to further
their own interests would agree should govern their forms of social life and institutions if they had to choose such principles from behind "a veil of ignorance"that is, 1n ignorance of their own abilities, of their psychological propensities
and conception of the good, and of their status and position in society and the
level of development of the society of which' they are to be members. The position
of these choosing parties is called "the original position."
Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 534, 53_5 (1973). "[L]iberty
is given a priority over all other advantages, so that it may be restricted or unequally
distributed only for the sake of liberty and not for any other form of social or eco•
nomic advantage." Id. at 536.
Specifically, Rawls considers
strict compliance [or ideal] as opposed to partial compliance theory •••• The latter
studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice •••• Obviously
the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters,
These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for be•
ginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the sys•
tematic grasp of these more pressing problems."
J. RAWLS, supra, at 8-9. I am, therefore, encouraged-with confidence in the value of
the inquiry if not in the precision of the argument-to suggest that the same principles
that move beyond utilitarian analysis in the assessment of justice in strict compliance
legal theory are also applicable to criminal punishments.
35. J. RAWLS, supra note 34, at 11. He therefore does not reach the issue of the
prisoner's relationship to "justice as fairness."
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This seems a much too narrow view. I could swiftly persuade a
mass of "original position contractors" (quite apart from any imprecise sentiments about "there, but for the Grace of God, go I")
that they might well be born into a highly criminogenic social
group-a disrupted family setting, membership within a prejudiced
class with life experiences typified by fortuitous involvement in
crime-bearing substantial risks of imprisonment for serious crime.
Because all human behavior results from the interaction between
endogenous processes and exogenous pressures and circumstances,
the blank.et exclusion of prisoners from Rawls's "worst-off members
of society" on the strength of a purported dominance of the individual's rationality and self-determination is unfounded. In considering
prisons and prisoners from behind the veil of ignorance, therefore,
we should include ourselves as potentially within the prison population; we would, in that context, subscribe to concepts of fairness and
justice that preclude the sacrifice of the individual prisoner to a
supposed larger social good.
Whatever my lack of clarity in relating Rawls's fundamental
principles of justice to the sentencing of convicted criminals, and to
the proper limits of imprisonment and prison punishments, this
much seems clear: Not only lack of knowledge forces us to hesitate
to impose dramatic or Draconian "cures" on criminals; basic views
of the minimum freedoms and dignities rightfully accorded human
beings stay our punitive hands.
Utilitarian values, of course, also limit punitive excess. Were the
punishment for the most trivial crime as severe as that for the most
serious any efficacy in differential deterrence or in the moral force
of the criminal law would dissipate. Nonetheless, the chief limitation remains our view of justice as fairness, according defined minimum freedoms and dignities to man qua man. The perception that
abuse of governmental power is a central problem of the human condition and that treatment of the criminal is closely bound to that
problem serves as the fundamental inhibitor of excess.
A proper cynicism about the likely abuse of power compels a
limitation on maximum control over the criminal to that justified,
wholly apart from considerations of curing him of his crime or protecting the rest of us permanently from future risk. We all know that
if criminals are coercively cured today, the rest of us may tomorrow
be regarded as in need of remedial training, both to achieve our
maximum social potential and to minimize collateral injuries to
others. If criminals, the mentally ill, or the retarded are subjected to

Ii80

Michigan Law Review

· coercive control beyond that justified by the past injuries they have
inflicted, then 'why not you, and certainly me? We find ourselves in
the business of remaking man, and that is beyond our competence;
it is an empyrean rather than an earthly task.

